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STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
V. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Cross Appellant. 
····'} 
'J ,, }. ORDER REGARDING MOTION 
• <. J FOR SUBSTITUTION OF 
;.,,.;:..,,\,.::·i lA'fECOUNSEL ' " ,flc:.1... .. 
UE:f ENOERsupreme Court No. 27966 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Supreme Court No. 31928 ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
A MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL with attachment was filed by Appellant on January 11, 2008. A RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL was filed January 23, 2008. After due consideration and good 
cause appeanng, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL be, and hereby is, RECOGNIZED, and will be treated as a Notice of Substitution pursuant to I.C. 19-871 and I.A.R. 45 as there is no legal, justiciable issue to be decided. 
DATED this __ ,,_J-_q_·· __ January 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM \V. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH;E SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
. CASE NO. CV-2001-04272 
ANSWER TO "[SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF" 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and does hereby answer Petitioner's (Dale Carter Shackelford) ''[Successive] 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" in the above-entitled action as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
All allegations made by Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically 
admitted herein. 
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II. 
SPECIFIC ANSlVERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS 
1. Regarding the portion of the petition entitled "Background," the State 
admits: 
a. On December 22, 2000, jury verdicts of guilty were rendered in Latah 
County Case Number CR-2000-00260, State of Idaho v. Dale Carter Shackelford, 
finding the defendant (petitioner herein) guilty of: 
i. Count I - First Degree Murder of Donna Fontaine; 
ii. Count II - First Degree Murder of Fred Palahniuk; 
m. Count III - First Degree Arson; 
iv. Count IV - Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder; 
v. Count V - Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson; 
v1. Count VI - Preparing False Evidence. 
b. On October 25, 2001, the Honorable John R. Stegner, District Judge, 
sentenced petitioner as follows: 
1. Count I - Death; 
ii. Count II - Death; 
iii. Count III - Twenty-five years, fixed; 
1v. Count IV - Life, fixed; 
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v. Count V - Twenty five years, fixed; 
vi. Count VI - Five years, fixed. 
The court records reflect that the written judgment of conviction was 
entered on November 1, 2001. 
c. On November 9, 2001, the Court appointed the State Appellate Public 
Defender (SAPD) to represent petitioner for purposes of pursuing post-
conviction relief. Subsequently, on December 6, 2001, a Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief was filed herein on behalf of petitioner which petition, over the 
course of the next several years, was supplemented and amended on numerous 
occas10ns. After lengthy post-conviction proceedings, the Court entered 
memorandum decisions and orders regarding both petitioner's Motion for 
Summary Disposition and the State's Motion to Dismiss. The net effect of those 
orders was to set aside the death penalties on Counts I and II based on the 2002 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 
S.Ct. 2428, 152 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). In all other respects, the verdicts of guilty, and 
the sentences on Count III, IV, V, and VI, were upheld. Petitioner then filed a 
Notice of Appeal of these post-conviction proceeding decisions on May 20, 2005, 
and the State filed a cross appeal on the same date. 
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d. The Petitioner also timely filed a direct appeal of his convictions and 
sentences in CR-00-00260 on December 4, 2001. That appeal was ultimately 
heard by the Idaho Supreme Court in conjunc~on with the appeals of the post-
conviction decisions in this case, and the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its 
substitute opinion on June 1, 2010 in State v. Shackelford, 247 P.3d 582. In its 
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the District Court, 
sustained the verdicts of guilty on all counts and the sentences on Counts III - VI. 
It also set aside of the death penalty on Counts I and II in light of the subsequent 
Ring decision but on different grounds. Following the denial of Petitions for 
Writs of Certiorari sought by both petitioner and the State, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's remittitur was filed in Latah County on March 21, 2011. Petitioner's case 
has now been remanded to the Latah County District Court for resentencing on 
Counts I and II. 
e. During the course of these post-conviction proceedings, petitioner filed a 
pro se Motion for Declaratory Judgment on June 6, 2003, which, after briefing and 
argument, was effectively denied by the District Court on or about March 8, 
2004. Petitioner thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal on March 24, 2004, although 
the actual order of the District Court denying petitioner's pro se Motion for 
ANSWER TO "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" -4 
Declaratory Judgment and companion pro se Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
was not filed until May 12, 2004. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court by order filed on June 24, 2004 (remittitur filed June 28, 2004). 
f. On December 1, 2006, petitioner filed a "Motion to Reconsider Order 
Appointing State Appellate Pubiic Defenderu which motion was denied by the 
Court on February 9, 2007, following consideration of responsive pleadings of 
the parties. Subsequently, the SAPD filed a motion to vacate the Court's order 
denying the defendant's motion to reconsider order appointing State Appellate 
Public Defender on March 23, 2007. On April 24, 2007, the Court entered an 
order vacating its February 9 order denying the defendant's motion to reconsider 
the order appointing the SAPD. During this time, attorney Teresa Hampton was 
retained as separate counsel for petitioner and there were requests for workload 
assessments in addition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the SAPD 
appointment order. An order denying petitioner's request for workload 
assessment was entered on September 26, 2007. On October 10, 2007, petitioner 
requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of his 
workload assessment request. This filing was done on petitioner's behalf by 
attorney Teresa Hampton who had been brought in as special counsel for 
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petitioner. Subsequently, on October 31, 2007, Ms. Hampton filed a "Motion to 
Withdraw Request for Permission to File Appeal from an Interlocutory Order." 
Thereafter, all of the remaining issues were addressed through the appeals 
process culminating in the Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, Substitute 
Opinion referenced above. 
2. In regard to the portion of the petition entitled "Argument (1) Review of 
Petition" (beginning on page 6 of the petition), the State denies that the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 19-2719(5) apply. Idaho Code § 19-2719 applies only to appellate and 
post-conviction procedures where the death penalty is imposed. In the case at bar, by 
virtue of Judge Stegner1s April 8, 2005, memorandum decisions and orders, and the 
Idaho Supreme Court's June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in 
this case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for resentencing. 
Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence to which the provisions of 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 apply. 
Additionally, even if Idaho Code § 19-2719 were to apply at this stage, 
petitioner's instant "[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" is facially 
insufficient in that it does not identify in any fashion (by precise statement with 
material facts stated under oath by credible persons with first hand knowledge, or 
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otherwise) any "issues that were not known or could not reasonably have been known" 
so as to be raised and addressed in the original post-conviction proceedings. See § 
Idaho Code 19-2719(5)(a). In fact, eyery issue referred to by petitioner is, on its face, not 
new and either was or reasonably should have been known during the course of the 
extensive original post-conviction proceedings herein which, as noted above, ran from 
the filing of the initial post-conviction petition on December 6, 2001, through the Court's 
memorandum decisions and orders of April 8, 2005, over three years later. The State 
further respectfully submits that petitioner's current assertions are largely cumulative 
and, even if true, would not cast doubt on the reliability of the convictions or sentences 
that have been upheld through the prior post-conviction and appellate proceedings. 
Similarly, to the extent that petitioner seeks relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
4901, et. seq., through his instant "[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," the 
issues he attempts to raise were either previously raised and addressed or have been 
waived, and there is no basis alleged to support a finding that "sufficient reason was not 
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental or amended 
application" for any of the instant claimed grounds for relief. See Idaho Code § 19-4908. 
In short, each of petitioner's claims in the instant "[Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief" were either raised and addressed in the prior proceedings (and are 
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therefore res judicata) or were waived (and petitioner is collaterally and statutorily 
estopped from attempting to assert them at this late date). 
3. In response to Section (2) of Petitioner's "Argument" (beginning at page 7), 
petitioner, without citing to any legal authority on point, attempts to argue that a jury is 
required to determine facts regarding sentencing where the death penalty is not 
imposed. That assertion is inconsistent with Idaho law as it existed at the time of the 
defendant's convictions and original sentences in 2000 and 2001, as well as under 
current Idaho law which has been amended to comply with Ring. A jury's role in 
sentencing under Ring is to determine whether a statutory aggravating factor exists 
beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, to then weigh any mitigating evidence before a 
sentence of death can be imposed. If a sentence of death is not sought or imposed, a 
jury has no role in a First Degree Murder sentencing. In the instant case, the sentencing 
court specifically noted that the State did not seek the death penalty on Count IV, th 
Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder conviction (Transcript pp. 5599-6000 
attached). Additionally, the defendant is not prejudiced by the lack of jury involvemen 
in the sentencing on Count IV be~ause the death penalty was not imposed and, eve 
under current law, it is the Court, not the jury, that imposes a sentence other than death 
(Idaho Code§ 19-2515(7)(c)). 
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Finally, as to this and virtually all of the petitioner's other allegations, if this issue 
was not raised in the original post-conviction proceedings and appeal, it certainly could 
or should have been and is therefore waived. 
4. As to Petitioner's "Argument (3) 11 beginning at page 10, his assertions of 
disproportionality are not based on anything new, and could and should have been 
raised in the prior post-conviction proceedings and/ or on appeal. As such, petitioner's 
claim of disproportionality has been waived and is barred. 
Additionally, as the Court properly considered at the time of sentencing, the 
petitioner's role in the conspiracy was substantially greater than that of either of the co-
conspirators in that the petitioner was the actual murderer and arsonist, originated the 
solicitations for murder and so forth. Petitioner also has a substantial criminal history 
compared to essentially no prior criminal history for either of the co-conspirators. 
These factors justify a substantially different and more serious sentence for the 
petitioner based on his history, conduct and prospective danger to society. 
5. In regard to petitioner's "Argument (4) 11 questioning the impartiality of the 
District Court (beginning at page 13), petitioner argues that somehow the Court's 
refusal to admit him to bail warrants post-conviction relief. In the first instance, 
petitioner asserts nothing new that could not have been raised in the prior post-
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conviction and appeal proceedings. Second, petitioner was not entitled to bail under 
Article 1 Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, LC. § 19-2903 and I.CR. 46(b). Finally, 
even if his allegations are true, there is nothing to suggest that they would cast doubt on 
the reliability of the convictions and sentences which have subsequently undergone 
lengthy and detailed scrutiny in both the prior post-conviction and appellate 
proceedings. 
6. In regard to petitioner's "Argument (5)" alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct, petitioner alleges nothing new: all of his assertions either were or 
reasonably could and should have been known and raised during the original post-
conviction and appellate proceedings. In fact, many issues regarding allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct were raised and litigated throughout the post-conviction and 
appellate proceedings. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised in the original post-
conviction proceeding or on direct appeal, the claims are procedurally defaulted, barred 
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as res judicata, and collaterally and statutorily estopped. Idaho Code§§ 19-4901(b) and 
19-4908. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent that Petitioner asserts claims not specifically raised previously, 
has failed to file such claims within the one year statute of limitation and the claims 
now time-barred. Idaho Code§ 19-4902(a). 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The "[Successive]" Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" contains bare and 
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible 
evidence, and therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-
4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906. 
PRIOR RECORD 
Respondent incorporates the prior pleadings, documents and other records in 
this case in addition to asking that the Court take judicial notice of the trial and 
appellate proceedings referenced in this case. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows: 
a) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied; 
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b) That Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be summarily dismissed 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906; 
c) for such olr and further relief as the court dee 
DATED this j \ day of Ap~20 . 
I 
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William W. Thompson 
Prosecuting Attorne 
necessary in the case. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO 
(SUCCESSIVE) PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF was 
/ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
IMSI, Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
Dated this / Nh day of April, 2011. 
ANSWER TO "[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" -13 
5996 
death penalty. He said it, his counsel said it. They 1 
l ook at the Court and say, don 1t kill the defendant, 2 
but it 's him who has placed himself in this position., 3 
He has earned i t every step of the way. This Court 1s 4 
not killing the defendant by imposing the death 5 
penalty . 6 
What this Court is doing .is followi~g the 7 
statutory procedure, totaling up the evidence, 8 
weighing the factors, considering the alternatives, 9 
weighing the various issues that the Court has raised 10 
today of statutory interpretation and then re3ching 11 
. the conclusion that is inescapable and unavoidable. 12 
And that's that as a proper sanction for the worst and 13 
the most evil act that our system can punish for -- on 14 
behalf of Donna Fontaine, Fred Palahniuk and the 15 
people of Idaho, we're asking this Court sentence the 16 
defendant to death. 17 
Thank you, Your Hcnor. 18 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Eckmann. 19 
Mr. Mahaffy, Mr. Barker, anything else to 20 
submit? 21 
MR. BP.RKER: Your Honor, what are you 22 
asking? 23 
THE COURT: Do you have anything else to 24 
submit? 25 
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THURSDAY, OC10BER 25, 2001 - 9:04 A.M . 
THE: COURT: We are on the record in Latah 
County Case No. CR-00-00260. It's the State of Idaho 
versus Dale Carter Shackelford. Present in court are 
Ms. Eckmann and Mr. Christer.sen on behalf of the 
State . Present on behalf of Mr. Shackelford are Mr. 
Barker and Mr. Mahaffy and Mr. Shackelford is present 
at counsel table with his attorneys . 
On December 22, 2000 a jury in Latah 
County convicted Mr. Shackelford of the following 
offenses, murder in the first degree of Donna 
Fontaine, which carries with it a maxinum penalty of 
death or a present sentence of ten years -- minimum 
prison sentence of ten years with a maximum prison 
sentence of life. Mr. Shackelford was also convicted 
of the murder of Fred Palahniuk, that offense carries 
with it a death penalty as well as life with a minimu.m 
of ten years confinement. 
He was also convicted of conspiracy to 
ccmmit ~urder, which carries with it a maximum penalty 
of death or life with a minimum of ten years 
confinement. He was also convicted of arson in the 
first degree, which carries with it a maximUJtt penalty 
of 25 years. Conspiracy to commit arson in the first 
degree, which carries with it maximum penalty of 25 
5999 
MR. BP.R~J:R: Ko, Your Honor. . -r years. And preparing false evidence, which.carries 
THE COURT: .Then I consider this matter 
completely at issue. And if I can get a decision 
written by the 19th of October, we'll have the 
senter.cing on the 19th of October, and if I can't, we 
will do it later. It is my fervent hope to have a 
written decision on the 19th of October. 
MS. ECKMANN : Will the Court r.o t ify us in 
advance of whether we'll --
THE COURT: Yes. 
up? 
MS. ECKMANN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else we need to tak-e 
MS. ECKMJI..NN: Nothing from the State. 
MR. BARKER: Nothing. 
THE COURT: Then we are in recess. 
[COURT RECESSED AT 5:28 P.M.) 
\2 with it a five-year maximwn penalty. 
3 Does the defendant have_ any lawful cause 
4 to know why judgment should not be pronounced against 
5 him at this time? 
6 MR. BARKER: No, Your Honor. 
7 THE: COU~T: Under Idaho law in a capital 
8 case a judge is required to make written findings 
9 regarding his or her determination that the death 
10 penalty is or is not correct. I have endeavored to 
11 put my findings :n writing and I am signing them this 
12 25th day of October, 2001. 
13 I have a copy for Mr. Shackelford. 
14 Would you please provide that to him. 
15 (BAILIFF COMPLIES) 
i 6 THE COURT: Mr.. Shackelford, have you been 
17 provided: a copy 0f that? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Judge. 
19 THE COURT: Then on the conviction of 
20 murder in the first degree of Donna Fontaine I impose 
21 the penalty of death . for the murder of fred 
22 Palahni uk , I impose the penalty of death. On the 
23 conspi racy to commit murder, I construe the argument .. 
24 m2de by the State at t he t ime of the sentencing 
25 recommendations to wi thdraw the requesI for the 
0.00056 
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~nalty of death for that charge and I impose a fixed 
ife imprisonment for that. 
For the arson in the first degree, I 
1q,ose a sentence of 25 years. For the conspiracy to 
coaroi t arson in the first degree, I impose a 25-year 
·entente. In the prepa:ing fa lse evidence, I impose a 
five-year sentence fi:sed. Zach of those is a fixed 
term and they will run concurrently. I don't bow of 
any reason to pile on. 
You have a right to appeal this decision. 
In fact, there is a stat:Jte that makes an appeal or a 
review. by the Supreme Coi;rt of this decision 
mandatory, but I need to advise you that if you want 
to challenge any of my legal er factual determinations 
-in this trial, you need to file an appeal. That 
appeal must be filed within 42 days of the filing of a 
:judgment. 
Ms. Eckmann, would you submit a judgment 
to that effect? 
MS. ECKMANN: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: To the effect of what I have 
'pronounced orally. 
.,  You also need to know that your appeal 
·must identify any remedies that would avai:able to you 
'under post-ccnviction acticns in this state. 
6001 
.. Primariiy that means that if you want to assert tha t 
·, your ccunsel was ineffective in representing you, you 
. need to assert that as an issue of appeal immediately. 
Mr. Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I believe 
.that's a whole separate proceeding. It's not an issue 
:of appeal, post-conviction. And I would point out 
19-2719 for the Court. And also for the Court to 
inquire the need for new counsel under 19-27i9(a }, 
THE COURT: Do you have anybody in mind? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, the state 
: public appellate defender's office. 
~BE COURT: Then would you subi~it an order 
to that effect? 
MS. ECKMANN: Appointing the state 
· appellate public defender's office? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. ECKMANN: Yes, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, nay we approach? 
;BE COURT: Yes, you may. 
ISIDE BAR HAD - NOT REPCRTE0l 
(D~ fE NSE CONfE~SJ 
THE COURT: To clarify the record, 1 am 
appointing tr.estate appellate public defender to 
pursue any post-ccnvicLon remedies that you may have 
6002 
1 avai lable to you, Mr. Shackelford. 
2 Your attorneys, Mr. Barker and Mr. 
3 Mahaffy, will continue to represent you in the things 
4 that are necessary for you to bring an appeal of any 
5 factual or legal challenge to the sentence of 
6 conviction or to the proceedings that briJg us to the 
7 imposition of that conviction. 
8 It may be that at scme point I will assign 
9 the state appellate public defender to represent you 
10 in the bringing of the appeal as well as the 
11 post-conviction remedy, but that, I think, is a 
12 question for another day. 
13 So, I am appointing the counsel for you to 
14 purs~e your post-conviction remedies, which would 
15 include, as.I have indicated, ineffective assistance 
16 of counsel. You' 11 need to work closely with that 
17 attorney to perfect whatever rights you have available 
18 . to you to challenge the conviction en that basis. 
19 Is there anything else we need to take up? 
20 MS. ECKMANN: Your Honor, I believe with 
21 regard to the transcript, if the Court can make 
22 directions. 
23 THE COURT: Since there is an automatic 
24 review by the Supreme Court a:id I believe statutory 
25 authority, the clerk and the court reporter are 
6003 
1· directed· to· begin preparation of a transcript and toe 
2 preparation of the record as quickly as possible . 
3 MS. ECKMANN: And then, Your Hcncr, I have 
4 one additional point of clarification, just with 
5 regard to the Court's order that the sentences run 
6 concurrent, can the Court c:arify which sentences run 
7 concurrent with each other? 
8 THE COURT: All of the sentences run 
9 concurre::it. 
10 MS. ECKMANN: Alright. 
11 HR. BARKER: I assume after this 
12 proceeding that we -can get a copy of the findings from 
13 the Court? 
14 THE COURT: Yes. And I have signed those. 
15 They will be made available to you as quickly as we 
16 can have copies made. 
17 MR. BARKER: Thcnk you. 
18 THE COURT: Is t:iere anything else we need 
19 to take up? 
20 MR. BARKER: No, Your Honor . 
21 MS. ECKMANN: Nothing from the State, Your 
22 :lonor. 
23 7HE COURT: Mr. Shackelford, may Gcd have 
24 me rcy on your soul. 
25 We' re in recess. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
The Petitioner, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), filed a motion 
requesting that this Court disqualify itself from presiding over his [Successive] 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Shackelford listed lack of impartiality and 
interest in the pending action as grounds for his motion brought under I.R.C.P. 
40(d)(2). Because this Court is unpersuaded that partiality or an interest in the 
pending action exists, the motion to disqualify will be denied. 
Good cause appearing, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE - I 
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause is 
DENIED. 
DATED this z 1> ~y of April 
)::t?- r\~ 
John R. Stegner. 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
Order were delivered to the following as indicated: 
Donald Ray Barker 
PO Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
FAX: (208) 882-7604 
William Wofford Thompson Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
-fTFax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax 
fflland Delivery 
[·1U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
On this ~ day of April 2011. 
r, 
Latah_Qol ty Clerk Jr t~e Co. ~rt 
1 By: .{ ! D ( ? , ) 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL 
______________ ) 
On March 18, 2011, Petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel asking this Court to appoint counsel to represent 
him in his post-conviction case. For the reasons stated, Shackelford's motion will be 
denied, without prejudice. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder, 
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts. 
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1 
8 
imposed prison sentences for the other felonies. Shackelford appealed and because 
he was sentenced to death he simultaneously brought an action seeking post-
conviction relief In 2005, this Court granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition 
to have his death sentences set aside, found three other claims moot, denied his 
remaining claims, and ultimately found that the multiple-murder aggravator of I.C. 
§ 19-2515 had been established. Shackelford appealed aspects of these rulings, and 
the State cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions 
as to guilt and post-conviction relief but remanded for a new sentencing hearing 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, as it pertains to the two first-degree murder charges. 
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 7, 2011 and the Idaho Supreme 
Court then issued a Remittitur. Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel 
to represent him in his underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000-
260). 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. Appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case. 
A request for the appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), I.C. § 19-4901 
et seq. Under the UPCPA, court-appointed counsel "may be made available to the 
applicant" upon the showing of need. I.C. § 19-4904 (italics added). "[A] needy 
applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the 
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau 
v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). LC.§ 19-852(b)(3) 
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describes the standard for determining whether such a proceeding is frivolous. Id. 
According to § 19-852(b)(3), a needy defendant is entitled to representation at 
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." 
B. Timeliness. 
LC. § 19-2719 governs post-conviction procedure in capital cases. Under LC. 
§ 19-2719(3), a defendant should file a challenge to the sentence or conviction 
"[w]ithin forty-two (42) days of the filing of the judgment." Failure to do so 
constitutes a waiver of all claims that "were known, or reasonably should have been 
known" at that time. LC. § 19-2719(5). According to McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 704, 992 P.2d 144, 153 (1999), this waiver applies "only to claims challenging 
the death sentence itself, not to all claims brought in conjunction with death 
sentences." 
"The legislature instituted the procedures of LC.§ 19-2719 'to accomplish the 
purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.' 
I.C. § 19-2719." Id. Thus, "[i]f necessary to avoid delay and accomplish the 
legislative purpose, a district court may sever non-death issues from death issues in 
post-conviction proceedings." Id. In McKinney, the court declined to analyze the 
non-death issues because they were untimely under LC. § 19-4902, but analyzed 
the death-issues under LC. § 19-2719. Id. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), which is found in 
I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., governs "all post-conviction claims that do not involve the 
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death sentence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. I.C. § 19-4902(a) 
states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction relief] may be filed at time 
· one (1) year the expiration of the time for appeal or the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an 
appeal, whichever is later." (Italics added.) 
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the 
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which 
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding 
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as 
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman v. 
State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089 - 1090 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was 
remanded for a sentencing hearing pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515, Shackelford has yet 
to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree murder. Even though the 
sentencing will not involve several of the charges in this case, it appears to be a 
"proceeding following an appeal," as is contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(a). It is an 
extension of the underlying criminal action - part of the continuous stream of 
events. Therefore, the proper time for Shackelford to file for post-conviction relief is 
within one year after he is sentenced pursuant to LC. § 19-2515. Severing the case 
and hearing the non-death issues now would not serve to eliminate unnecessary 
delay in carrying out a death sentence. Thus, Shackelford's post-conviction petition 
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is untimely. A reasonable person would not bring such a petition at this time. 
Good cause appearing, 
IS ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for 
DENIED, without prejudice. 
,.so 
DATED this 2,. day of May 2011. 
of Counsel 
r~~ 
Jo~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that full, true, complete and correct copies of the foregoing 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL were delivered to the following as indicated: 
Donald Ray Barker 
PO Box 9408 
Moscow, ID 83843 
FAX: (208) 882-7604 
William Wofford Thompson Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Latah County Courthouse 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613/ IMSI / Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
On this ----=-- day of May 2011. 
rfU.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax 
f1 Hand Delivery 
f:tU.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[] Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
I' 
Latah ~~erf J the 51jillrk . ~ , 
By:  I &t) ~{/WUJ\,,/ 
Deputy Clerk ~ 
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LATAH COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
WILLIAM W. THOMPSON, JR. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Latah County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, Idaho 83843-0568 
(208) 883-2246 
ISB No. 2613 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) CASE NO. CV-2001-04272 
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DISPOSITION 
2 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through the Latah County Prosecuting 
Attorney, and hereby moves for summary disposition of Petitioner's "[Successive] 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief'' pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4906(c) for the reasons 
detailed in the State's "Answer to '[Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief'" filed 
herein on April 11, 2011. Petitioner's convictiqns and sentences on Counts III (First 
Degree Arson), Count IV (Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder), Count V 
(Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson), and Count VI (Preparing False Evidence), 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -1-
have been upheld on appeal and are, therefore final. Petitioner fails to raise any issues 
that were not or could not have been raised in said appeal and, consequently, is not 
entitled to pursue any further relief on those convictions and sentences. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code 19-4906(c), Respondent respectfully submits that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATEDthis S dayofMay,2 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION: -2-
William W. Thompson, Jr. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION was 
/ mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
hand delivered 
__ sent by facsimile, original by mail 
to the following: 
Dale Carter Shackelford #64613 
IMSI, Unit J 
P.O. Box 51 
Boise, ID 83707 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH . 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
On May 18, 2011, petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP 1 l(a)(2)(B)) asking this Court to reconsider its May 
2, 2011, Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. For the 
reasons stated, Shackelford's motion will be denied, without prejudice. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder, 
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts. 
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and 
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imposed prison sentences for the other charges. Shackelford appealed and 
simultaneously brought an action seeking post-conviction relief. In 2005, this Court 
granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition to have his death sentences set aside, 
found three other claims moot, and denied his remaining claims. Shackelford 
appealed aspects of these rulings, and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions as to guilt and post-conviction·relief 
and remanded for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to LC.§ 19-2515, as it 
pertains to the two first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur. 
Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel to represent him in his 
underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000-260). 
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause, a 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Capital Case, and a [Successive] Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief Capital Case. The State filed an Answer to "[Successive] Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief' and Shackelford filed a reply. This Court denied 
Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause and also issued an Order Denying 
Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter, Shackelford filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP ll(a)(2)(B)). Since then, the State has 
indicated that it will not seek a death sentence for the two remaining charges in 
Shackelford's underlying criminal case. 
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II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Appointment of counsel in a post-conviction case. 
As this Court stated in its Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel, a request for the appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding 
is governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), LC. § 19-
4901 et seq. Under the UPCPA, court-appointed counsel "may be made available to 
the applicant" upon the showing of need. LC.§ 19-4904 (italics added). "[A] needy 
applicant for post-conviction relief is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the 
trial court determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau 
v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004). Idaho Code§ 19-852(b)(3) 
describes the standard for determining whether such a proceeding is frivolous. Id. 
According to LC. § 19-852(b)(3), a needy defendant is entitled to representation at 
public expense unless the proceeding is "not a proceeding that a reasonable person 
with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." 
Timeliness. 
Title 19, Chapter 27, of the Idaho Code governs criminal procedure in capital 
cases. Shackelford argues that LC. § 19-2719 et seq. applies to this case. Idaho 
Code§ 19-2719 sets forth the special procedures which are to "be interpreted to 
accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid 
death sentence." 
The State aptly notes, however, that: 
In the case at bar, by virtue of Judge Stegner's April 8, 2005, 
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memorandum decisions and orders, and the Idaho Supreme Court's 
June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in this 
case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for 
resentencing. Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence 
to which the provisions of Idaho Code § 19 apply. 
(Answer to "[Successive] Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief' at 6.) Further, the State 
has since indicated that it will not seek the death sentence on remand. Since the 
death sentence imposed in this case was set aside, and a new death sentence is not 
being sought, LC. § 19-2719 et seq. does not apply to this case. In addition, I.C.R. 
Rule 44.2, which requires appointment of counsel for post-conviction review in a 
death penalty case, no longer applies. 
Idaho Code § 19-4901 et seq. governs "all post-conviction claims that do not 
involve the death sentence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111. 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction relief] may 
be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or 
from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding 
following an appeal, whichever is later." 
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the 
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which 
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Atkinson, 131 Idaho 222, 224, 
953 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding 
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as 
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman u. 
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State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089-1090 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was remanded 
for sentencing, Shackelford to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree 
murder. Even though the sentencing will not upset the judgment of conviction, it 
appears to be a "proceeding following an appeal," as is contemplated by LC. § 19-
4902(a). It is an extension of the underlying criminal action - part of the 
continuous stream of events. Therefore, Shackelford has until one year after this 
Court imposes a sentence for the first degree murder charges to pursue post-
conviction claims. 
According to Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 425, 745 P.2d 300, 304 (Ct. 
App. 1987), the language of LC.§ 19-4902 "reflects the limitation period for such 
proceedings." In general, "post-conviction relief is available while an appeal is 
pending." Id. Where "the post-conviction application is grounded in the same facts 
and issues presented on appeal, summary dismissal is appropriate." Id. at 426, 7 45 
P.2d at 305. Further: 
If an application is based upon facts outside the scope of the 
pending appeal, summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the 
application may be either dismissed without prejudice or suspended 
until the appeal is resolved. E.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 
556 (197 5). Such procedures preserve the interests of the applicant and 
provide a common sense approach for handling concurrent proceedings. 
Id. Suspending such a proceeding until it can be consolidated with another serves 
to promote judicial economy. See Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214, 221-222, 579 P.2d 
1197, 1204-1205. 
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Here, Shackelford argues that "it is impossible to assign/parse the effect of 
the fundamental Constitutional violations on each count tried - capital or non-
capital. ... " (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2.) Shackelford further argues that "the 
claims before this Court in the [Successive] PCR petition include both directly and 
collaterally, issues involving death and non-death sentencing and guilt phase 
matters .... " (Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4.) These arguments support the 
determination that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing 
to bring this proceeding at his own expense. Rather, to avoid unnecessary expense 
and redundancy, a reasonable person would wait to bring it until after being 
resentenced. At that point, Shackelford may want to again request the 
appointment of counsel in this matter. 
Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for Reconsideration (IRCP 
ll(a)(2)(B)) is DENIED, without prejudice. 
DATED this '3 ""day of July 2011. 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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J ~ R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
Case No. CV-2001-4272 
ORDER SUSPENDING 
PETITIONER'S [SUCCESSIVE] 
PETITION, DENYING HIS 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
FILE ADDENDUM, AND DENYING 
THE STATE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Petitioner Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford") filed a [Successive] Petition 
for Post Conviction Relief Capital Case asking this Court to grant him post-conviction 
relief and a Motion for Leave to File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. In Response, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. 
For the reasons stated in this Order, Shackelford's petition will be suspended and his 
motion for leave to file an addendum will be denied, without prejudice. The State's 
motion will also be denied, without prejudice. 
ORDER SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Shackelford was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder, 
first-degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit 
arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found him guilty on all counts. 
This Court sentenced Shackelford to death for both first-degree murders, and 
imposed prison sentences for the other charges. Shackelford appealed and 
simultaneously brought an action seeking post-conviction relief. In 2005, this Court 
granted Shackelford's post-conviction petition to have his death sentences set aside, 
found three other claims moot, and denied his remaining claims. Shackelford 
appealed aspects of these rulings, and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld this Court's decisions as to guilt and post-conviction relief 
and remanded for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to LC. § 19-2515, as it 
pertains to the two first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur. 
Since then Shackelford has been appointed counsel to represent him in his 
underlying criminal case (Latah County Case No. CR-2000-260). 
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause, a 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel Capital Case, and a [Successive] Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief Capital Case. The State filed an Answer to "[Successive] Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief' and Shackelford filed a reply. This Court issued an order 
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denying Shackelford's Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause and also issued an Order 
Denying Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter, the 
State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Shackelford filed a Motion for 
Leave to File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The 
State has recently indicated that it will not seek a death sentence for the two 
remaining charges in Shackelford's underlying criminal case. 
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 
Timeliness. 
Title 19, Chapter 27, of the Idaho Code governs criminal procedure in capital 
cases. Shackelford argues that LC. § 19-2719 et seq. applies to this case. Idaho 
Code§ 19-2719 sets forth the special procedures which are to "be interpreted to 
accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid 
death sentence." 
The State aptly argues: 
In the case at bar, by virtue of Judge Stegner's April 8, 2005, 
memorandum decisions and orders, and the Idaho Supreme Court's 
June 1, 2010, decision, the previously imposed death penalties in this 
case have been set aside and the case has been remanded for 
resentencing. Consequently, there is no sentence of death in existence 
to which the provisions of Idaho Code § 19-2719 apply. 
(Answer to "[Successive] Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief' at 6.) Further, the State 
has since indicated that it will not seek the death sentence on remand. Since the 
death sentence imposed in this case has been set aside, and a new death sentence is 
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not being sought, I.C. § 19-2719 et seq. does not apply to this case. 
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), which is found in 
§ 19-4901 et seq., governs "all post-conviction claims that do not involve the 
death sentence." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004). Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) states that "[a]n application [for post-conviction 
relief] may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time 
for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a 
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." 
A "proceeding following appeal is any proceeding that is an extension of the 
underlying criminal action, and is part of the continuous stream of events which 
lead to the finality of the judgment of conviction." Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 
207, 984 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Atkinson, 131 Idaho 222, 224, 
953 P.2d 662, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). A "'proceeding 
following an appeal' may include a remand of the criminal case to the trial court as 
a consequence of the direct appeal from a judgment of conviction." Freeman v. 
State, 122 Idaho 627, 628-629, 836 P.2d 1088, 1089-1090 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In this case, since the death sentences were set aside and the matter was remanded 
for ·sentencing, Shackelford has yet to be sentenced on the two counts of first-degree 
murder. Even though the sentencing will not upset the judgment of conviction and 
does not involve several of the charges in this case, it appears to be a "proceeding 
following an appeal," as is contemplated by I.C. § 19-4902(a). It is an extension of 
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the underlying criminal action - part of the continuous stream of events. Therefore, 
Shackelford has until one year after this Court imposes a sentence for the first 
degree murder charges to pursue post-conviction claims. 
According to Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 425, 745 P.2d 300, 304 (Ct. 
App. 1987), the language of LC.§ 19-4902 "reflects the limitation period for such 
proceedings." In general, "post-conviction relief is available while an appeal is 
pending." Id. Where "the post-conviction application is grounded in the same facts 
and issues presented on appeal, summary dismissal is appropriate." Id. at 426, 7 45 
P.2d at 305. Further: 
If an application is based upon facts outside the scope of the 
pending appeal, summary judgment is not appropriate. However, the 
application may be either dismissed without prejudice or suspended 
until the appeal is resolved. E.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 
556 (1975). Such procedures preserve the interests of the applicant and 
provide a common sense approach for handling concurrent proceedings. 
Id. Suspending such a proceeding until it can be consolidated with another serves 
to promote judicial economy. See Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214, 221-222, 579 P.2d 
1197, 1204-1205. 
Here, Shackelford argues that "it is impossible to assign/parse the effect of 
the fundamental Constitutional violations on each count tried capital or non-
capital. ... " (Mot. for Reconsideration at 2.) Shackelford further argues that "the 
claims before this Court in the [Successive] PCR petition include both directly and 
collaterally, issues involving death and non-death sentencing and guilt phase 
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matters .... " (Mot. for Reconsideration at 3-4.) These arguments support this 
Court's determination that waiting until Shackelford is resentenced on the 
remaining two counts before resolving his [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction 
for Post Conviction Relief Capital Case is proper. Doing so will promote judicial 
efficiency. 
In addition, Shackelford's resentencing has been set for next month. As a 
result, this Court's decision to suspend his Petition now should not result in any 
prejudice to him. 
Motion for Leave to File Addendum to Successive Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief. 
Since this Court is suspending Shackelford's [Successive] Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief Capital Case, his Motion for Leave to File Addendum to 
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief will be denied, without prejudice. 
Good cause appearing, 
It is ORDERED that Shackelford's [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief Capital Case is SUSPENDED. 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Disposition 
is DENIED, without prejudice. 
It is FURTHER ORDERED that Shackelford's Motion for Leave to File 
Addendum to Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief is DENIED, without 
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prejudice. 
Y ~y of July 2011. DATED this 
IV'- n~ Jl R. Stegner 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, ) 
Petitioner, 
) 
) CASE NO. CV-2001-4272 
) 
v. ) MOTION FOR REVIEW BY STATE OF IDAHO, ) DISTRICT COURT OF 
Respondent. 
) PROPOSED STIPULATIONS ) 
[IRCP 6(e) (3)] 
COMES NOW THE PETITIONER, prose and moves this Court to review, and 
consider entering an ORDER enacting the PROPOSED STIPULATIONS set forth herein 
in the interest of judicial and party economy. Nothing herein constitutes a 
waiver of any right, claim or other matter(s) by Petitioner, and SHALL NOT 
operate as an adjudication on the merits of any matter unless specifically 
agreed upon by the Petitioner and the State, in writing, and approved by the 
Court (IRCP 4l(a)(l)(ii)). 
Petitioner would move this Court to utilize the inherent authority vested 
by law in facilitating an agreement between the parties to prevent ongoing, 
needless and never-ending litigation in this case. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW BY DISTRICT COURT OF PROPOSED STIPULATIONS - l 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was originally charged with two counts of first-degree murder, 
first degree arson, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, conspiracy to 
commit arson, and preparing false evidence in 2000. A jury found Petitioner 
guilty on all counts. This Court sentenced the Petitioner to death for both 
first-degree murders, and imposed prison sentences for the other charges. 
Petitioner appealed and simultaneously brought an action seeking 
post-conviction relief on all convictions, [capital or not] as required by 
Idaho's Special Appellate and Post-Conviction Procedure for Capital cases 
(I.C.§19-2719). In 2005, this Court granted Petitioner's post-conviction 
petition to have the death sentences set aside, found three other claims moot, 
and denied the remaining claims. Petitioner appealed aspects of that ruling, 
and the State cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld this Court's 
decision as to guilt and post-conviction relief, and remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing pursuant to I.C.§19-2515, as it pertained to the two 
first-degree murder charges. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 
7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court then issued a Remittitur. Petitioner was 
thereafter appointed counsel to represent him on resentencing on the 
first-degree murder counts (I & II of the amended Indictment) in Latah County 
Case No. CR00-00260. 
On March 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge for 
Cause, a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Capital Case), and a [Successive] 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Capital Case). The State filed an Answer 
to the [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief, and Petitioner filed 
MOTION FOR REVIEW BY DISTRICT COURT OF PROPOSED STIPULATIONS - 2 
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Reply. This Court thereafter issued an ORDER denying Petitioner's Motion to 
Disqualify Judge for Cause, and also issued an ORDER Denying Petitioner's 
Motion for Appointment of Counsel. Shortly thereafter, the State filed a 
Motion for Surmnary Disposition, and Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to 
File Addendum to [Successive] Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
On July 8, 2011, this Court issued an ORDER SUSPENDING PETITIONER'S 
[SUCCESSIVE] PETITION, DENYING HIS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ADDENDUM, AND 
DENYING THE STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION. On September 28, 2011, 
Petitioner was (re)sentenced by this Court in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260 
to terms of ( fixed) life imprisonment. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, 
and the Office of The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was thereafter 
appointed by this Court to represent Petitioner on the appeal from the 
(re) sentencing. That appeal is pending preparation and submission of the 
record/transcript by the Latah County clerk/reporter. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Petitioner would aver that the action(s) and rulings which form the basis 
of the claims set forth in the Petitioner's [Successive] Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief are appropriately before this Court pursuant to 
I.C.§19-2719 in that the claims therein arose, and (should have been) 
submitted within the petition for post-conviction relief prior to the setting 
aside of the sentences of death by this Court in 2005. Further, [these] 
claims, for the most part, relate to ALL counts of the (amended) Indictment 
and those convictions upon which the Petitioner was sentenced. 
MOTION FOR REVIEW BY DISTRICT COURT OF PROPOSED STIPULATIONS - 3 
l Because of the (unified) post-conviction procedures applicable to the 
original petition in this case fell under the mandates of I C. §19-2719 for 
filing, it is only logical that the "continuation" of that post-conviction 
application, as is the [successive] petition in this matter, which bears the 
SAME CASE NUMBER as that filed pursuant to I.C.§19-2719, must too be pursuant 
to [that] code, as the action can not simply "change horses in midstream" and 
become an action under the auspices of I.C.§19-4901. 
Idaho law (citations omitted) is clear that an application for 
post-conviction relief may be filed, considered and adjudicated by a district 
court concurrently with a direct appeal to a reviewing Court, so long as the 
application for post-conviction relief does not contain the same claim(s) as 
presented for review to the appellate court. In this [unique] case, only those 
matters related to the (2000-01) trial are included within the [successive] 
petition for post-conviction relief that is now pending/suspended, while only 
those issues directly associated with the (2011) resentencing will be 
presented on direct appeal, with a separate (NEW) post-conviction application 
being filed thereafter on the (fixed) life sentences pursuant to I.C.§19-4901. 
While data/claims within the [successive] application could overlap based on 
the same (murder) convictions and fundamental errors at trial which resulted 
in conviction, such is the nature of the circumstances presented by the 
differences in procedure involved in this case. 
l In Capital cases, applications for post-conviction relief are adjudicated 
first, and any appeal therefrom is combined with any direct appeal from 
conviction, opposite of the procedure in non-capital cases, and the 
resentencing to a term of (fixed) life will require petitioner to file his 
NEW application for post-conviction relief pursuant to I.C.§19-4901. 
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III. PROPOSED STIPULATIONS 
1). Petitioner would immediately move this Court to dismiss, without 
prejudice, the pending/suspended petition for post conviction relief filed 
pursuant to I.C.§19-2719 (CVOl-004272). Petitioner would be authorized to 
(re) file a NEW application for post conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code 
§19-4901 et seq. which would include all claims that were/would be included in 
the existing (pending/suspended) post conviction relief petition, as well as 
any claims related to the resentencing of the petitioner on Counts I and II of 
the amended indictment in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260 on September 28, 
2011 [which are not disposed of on direct appeal]. 
2). Petitioner shall be authorized to file a NEW Application for Post 
Conviction Relief (APCR) within one (1) year of remittitur being issued on the 
direct appeal of the sentenced imposed by this Court on September 28, 2011 
(I.C.§19-4901). The Petitioner shall be authorized to include and raise 
any/all claims which have not been previously (clearly and directly) 
adjudicacated (upon their merits) in Petitioner's previous petition for post 
conviction relief, or direct appeal from conviction. 
3). Upon filing a [NEW] APCR pursuant to I.C.§19-4901 as described in ~l 
above, the Court shall cause a separate and distinct case number to be 
assigned to the NEW petition which is different from that case number assigned 
to the pending/suspended petition filed pursuant to I.C.§19-2719 (i.e., 
CVOl -004272) • 
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4). Petitioner shall be authorized to (re) file a Motion to Disqualify 
(Judge) pursuant to IRCP 40 in conjunction with the filing of the [NEW] APCR. 
5). Any/all claims presented within the [NEW] APCR will be adjudicated 
upon [their] merits, and any objections/defenses by the state that any claim 
contained therein may have been presented on (direct) appeal would be waived. 
6). That upon the filing of a [NEW] APCR by the Petitioner, this Court 
will appoint counsel to represent the Petitioner in the action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays this Court grant relief as requested 
herein in the interest of justice and judicial economy. 
DATE: ~~~I;;,_ 
I 
/~ c_ 
~~- Shackelford, 
Petitioner, prose. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have mailed (served) a copy of the foregoing, postage 
pre-paid to: 
William Wofford Thompson Jr. 
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843-0568 
On this day of I 2012 
• Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
petitioner, prose. 
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Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, ) 
Petitioner, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2001-4272 
v. ) 
) MOTION TO AMEND [SUCCESSIVE] 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
Respondent. 
) RELIEF. ) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, pro se, and moves this Court to allow the 
amendment of the (pending) [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
in the interest of justice and clarity pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(a). Petitioner has attached hereto a copy of the amended petition 
as required. 
Dated this 51).. day of fa~ 2012. 
pA(f1lp 
Dale C. Shackelford 
PETITIONER, prose 
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Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / rec 
P.O. BOX 70010 
BOISE, ID 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2001-4272 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF. 
Evidentiary Hearing & Appointment 
of Counsel Requested 1 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Dale Carter Shackelford (Shackelford), pro 
se, and files this Amended [Successive] Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
Petitioner hereby incorporates herein by reference in its entirety the 
preceding record in this case (No. CVOl-004272) and all exhibits, addendui;i and 
matters collaterally related thereto as allowed by law and rule. 
Petitioner states that the claims described herein entitle him to relief 
requested pursuant to Article I, §§ 6, 13 & 18 of the Idaho Constitution, and 
amendments 1, 5, 6, 8 & 14 of the United States Constitution. Petitioner 
hereby, for each claim presented, preserves same for state and federal review. 
BALDWIN v. REESE, 541 U.S. 27, 124 S.Ct. 1347 (2004). 
Separate motions for Evidentiary Hearing and appointment of Counsel are being filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF -
If: 55 
Petitioner contends that the claims presented herein are distinctly 
different from those raised on the (original) application for post-conviction 
relief under I.C.§19-2719 or upon appeal therefrom. To the extent this Court 
holds any claims, facts or prejudice therefrom described as duplicative, the 
claims are presented so as to give the state courts a full and fair 
opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon 
petitioner's constitutional claims which may have been unclear in previous 
filings. PICARD v. CONNOR, ("[s]tate prisoner [must] present the state courts 
with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts".) see also, DUNCAN v 
HENRY, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (per curiam). 
In each of the claims presented infra, Shackelford suffered substantial 
and injurious effects due to the improper influences upon the jury from the 
deliberate and especially egregious errors perpetrated by the state as 
described. The errors described, combined with the pattern of prosecutorial 
misconduct illustrated herein so infected the integrity of the proceedings 
that it lessened the government's burden of proof and thereby denied 
Shackelford's Sixth amendment right to a fair trial, made applicable pursuant 
to the Fourteenth amendment, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
These errors, in affecting the entire adjudicatory framework, are structural, 
and defy analysis by harmless error standards. PUCKETT v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 
1423, 1432 (2009) (quoting ARIZONA v. FULMINATE, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 
1246 (1991)). 
Due to Shackelford having been sentenced to death on the two ( 2) First 
Degree Murder convictions, he was required to comply with the provisions of 
I.e. §19-2719 et seq. and utilize the post-conviction procedures prior to 
receiving a direct appeal review. This petition then is best described as an 
"initial-review proceeding" as the term is used in MARTINEZ v. RYAN, U.S. 
~-' 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). 
In that the [only] basis cited by this Court in suspending the instant 
proceedings was the [ then] upcoming resentencing, and the facts contained 
within this (amended) petition are not within the scope of the direct appeal 
AMENDED !SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2 
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from the resentencing now pending in the Idaho Supreme Court, the suspension 
on this proceeding should be lifted, and the proceedings resumed. PARSONS v 
STATE, 113 Idaho 421 745 P.2d 300 (Ct.App. 1987). 
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BACKGROUND 
Shackelford was originally charged by Indictment with two counts of First 
Degree (premeditated) Murder, First Degree Arson, Conspiracy to Commit First 
Degree Murder, Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson and Preparing False 
Evidence in 2000. A jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts, and this 
Court sentenced Shackelford to death for each of the First Degree Murder 
counts and imposed the maximum sentences available on each of the other 
felonies. Shackelford appealed, and because he was sentenced to death, 
simultaneously brought a post-conviction action pursuant to §19-2719, which 
resulted in the death sentences being set aside. The Court also denied claims 
related to the other sentences and guilt phase issues raised in the petition. 
Shackelford appealed aspects of the rulings made by the trial court on 
post-conviction relief, and the state cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's decisions as to post-conviction claims, and remanded 
for a new sentencing on the two First Degree Murder counts. The U.S. Supreme 
Court denied certiorari on March 7, 2011, and the Idaho Supreme Court issued a 
Remittitur. 
In March 2011, Shackelford filed a [successive] petition for 
post-conviction relief along with a motion for appointment of counsel. In May 
2011, Shackelford filed a motion for leave to file an addendum to the 
petition. In July 2011, this Court issued an ORDER suspending the successive 
petition, denying the motion for leave to file the addendum and denying the 
state's motion for summary disposition, all without prejudice. The Court also 
denied without prejudice Shackelford's motion for appointment of counsel. The 
Court identified the [ then] upcoming resentencing as the rationale for the 
decision (ORDER, July 8, 2011, page 6). 
In September 2011, Shackelford was resentenced by this Court to 
consecutive terms of (fixed) life on each of the murder counts. The Court 
appointed the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) to 
represent Shackelford on direct appeal on the resentencing. That appeal is 
still pending. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED HEREIN 
I. DID THE COURT'S IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR THE STATE TO PROVE EACH 
ELEMENT CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? 
II. DID THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
RESULTING IN A VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW? 
III. DID UNCURED VOUCHING 
WITNESSES AND INTERJECTION OF 
FOR THE 
PERSONAL 
CREDIBILITY OF 
OPINION(S) BY 
STATE 
DEPUTY 
PROSECUTOR ROBIN ECKMANN DEPRIVE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL AND 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW? 
IV. DID 
INCREASING 
THE COURT 
THE MAXIMUM 
VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO 
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT 
JURY BY 
A JURY 
DETERMINATION OF FACTS NECESSARY TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO MORE 
THAN TEN YEARS TO LIFE? 
V. DID THE LACK OF IMPARTIALITY BY TRIAL COURT JUDGE DENY 
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL? 
VI. DID INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF UNIFIED 
POST-CONVICTION/APPELLATE COUNSEL DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW? 
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LIST OF ATTACHED EXHIBITS 
Exhibit A: Affidavit of Dr. Roderick Saxey 
Exhibit B: X-ray (photocopy) of Victim A. 
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I. THE COURT I S 
(ACCOMPLICE/AIDING & 
IMPROPER SUBMISSION OF 
ABETTING) TO THE JURY 
INSTRUCTION No.33 
OVER DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OR INDICIA 
ELIMINATED 
OF 
THE AIDING/ABETTING (ACCOMPLICE) BEING ESTABLISHED 
STATE I S BURDEN OF PROOF IN PROVING EACH OF THE ELEMENTS TO THE 
CRIMES UPON WHICH DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED, BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
It is well settled that aiding & abetting is not a criminal offense, but a 
theory of liability to the commission of a crime (STATE v. AYRES, 70 Idaho 18, 
25, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); STATE v. JOHNSON, 145 Idaho 970, 188 P.3d 912 (2008); 
U.S. v. SMITH, 198 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 1999)), thus, one can not be convicted of 
being both the principal and the aider & abetter (accomplice) in the same 
criminal act without running afoul of (double jeopardy) protections guaranteed 
by the U.S. Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. 
In Idaho, the law specifically limits the classification of parties to a 
crime to the principal and accessories (I.C.§18-203(1) & (2)) and does not 
recognize accomplice (theory) as a means by which a person may be party to a 
criminal act. As a result, the (accomplice theory) instruction (No. 33) which 
was submitted to the jury at trial and applied to the essential elements to be 
proven against the defendant was improper. Where there is grave doubt about 
whether the trial court I s error had a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury's verdict[s], that error is not harmless, 
O'NEAL v. McANICH, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992 (1995); CUPP v. NAUGHTEN, 
414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396 (1973). (Where a reviewing court is "in virtual 
eguipose as to the harmlessness of the error," the court should "treat the 
error ••• as if it affected the verdict ••. ") FRY v. PLILER, 551 U.S. 112, 120-21 
n.3, 127 S.Ct. 2321 (2007) (quoting O'NEAL, 513 U.S. at 435). 
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In each of the crimes upon which the defendant was indicted and convicted, 
Shackelford was charged as the principal, and there was no evidence put forth by 
the state at trial that there was an accomplice to the crime ( s) , thus, the 
evidence was insufficient to have submitted the accomplice theory instruction 
(No. 33) to the jury. 
The submission of Instruction No. 33 had the ultimate (and prejudicial) 
effect of allowing the jury to "invent" or speculate to the existence of an 
accomplice, and to assign/impute any, but not all of the essential elements that 
were required to have been found against a single individual to any number of 
theoretical accomplices in the likeness of a "Chinese Menu" (e.g., actus reus to 
principal on element l of count l with mens rea to element 3 of count l assigned 
to accomplice) without finding all the essential elements necessary to convict 
attributable to Shackelford as the principal, or to any specific [theoretical] 
accomplice. This relieved the state of its burden of persuasion beyond a 
reasonable doubt ( against the defendant) of every essential element of the 
crime(s) charged. FRANCIS v. FRANKLIN, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985); 
see In re WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) (holding that due 
process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged). Further, Instruction No. 33 impermissibly shifted 
the burden to the defendant to prove that an accomplice was not involved in any 
of the criminal acts charged - despite the fact that the accomplice theory 
( instruction) was disclosed to the defendant only after the close of all 
evidence at trial unlike the facts in JOHNSON where the proposed jury 
instructions were submitted prior to trial. The variance between the 
indictment ( s) and the verdict misled and embarrassed the defendant in the 
preparation and presentation of the defense, making the process fatally 
defective (STATE v. WINDSOR, 110 Idaho 410, 418, 716 P.2d 1182, 1190 (1985); 
BERGER v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1935)i 
It is presumed that juries follow instructions they are given (WEEKS v. 
ANGELONE, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 s.ct. 727, 733 (2000); U.S. v. OLANO, 507 U.S. 
625, 740, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781 (1993)), thus, it is apparent that the jury in 
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the Shackelford trial read and utilized the accomplice instruction (No. 33) 
which impermissibly allowed a finding of guilt even where it was impossible, 
based on the evidence submitted at trial, to have found that Shackelford had 
(committed) each of the elements set forth in the criminal acts charged. These 
elements then must have necessarily been attributed to any number of 
theoretical, unnamed accomplices, yet "found" against Shackelford as the 
principal as authorized by Instruction No. 33. 
Idaho Code §19-1411 requires certainty in the Indictment by mandating that 
indictment be direct and certain in regards to (1) the party charged, and (2) 
the offense charged. While it is settled that "one who has been indicted as a 
principal may be convicted on evidence showing only that he aided and abetted 
the offense" (U.S. v. INGLESIAS, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990) emphasis 
added) there was no evidence at the Shackelford trial alleging, implying or 
proving that there was an accomplice, or that anyone except Shackelford 
committed each act (actus reus) with the (requisite) state of mind (mens rea) 
necessary to convict. Idaho law permits an accessory to a crime to be indicted, 
tried and punished, though the principal may be neither indicted or tried 
(I.C.§19-1431), though the statutes stand silent as to whether an accomplice may 
be so tried. This is clearly due to the fact that accomplice theory in Idaho 
does not exist in law. 
Submission by the court of jury instruction No. 33, over the objection of 
the defendant, provided allowances to the jury which obviated the need of each 
juror to agree upon and/or find, 
element including the elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, each essential 
of finding "the defendant, DALE CARTER 
SHACKELFORD" as required - committed each element of the crime(s), and instead, 
allowed elements of each crime to be divided between Shackelford and theoretical 
accomplices, then further dividing the mens rea and actus reus, without finding 
that a single individual, either Shackelford or an accomplice(s) committed all 
the elements necessary to be convicted of a crime, thereby violating due process 
guarantees made by both the state and federal constitutions. 
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Based on the above, Shackelford could be convicted only as either a 
principal, or an aider/abetter of the criminal acts charged, not both, on each 
of the six (6) counts upon which he was indicted and ultimately convicted. 
Alternatively, Shackelford must be considered no more than an accessory as 
prescribed by I.C. §18-205, punishable as prescribed by I.C. §18-206 (see also 
r.c. §19-1430). 
In addition to the above, the allowances made by the wording of 
Instruction No. 33 effectively elimates(ed) ability of the defendant to mount 
an alibi defense in any case where such language is used in a jury 
instruction. 
As noted in the district court in its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS in denying Shackelford's Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel claim based on failure to request an alibi instruction; 
"It also would have been inappropriate to instruct the jury on an alibi 
defense where, as here, the jury was instructed that [Shackelford] could be 
found guilty for aiding and abetting the commission of these offenses." (id at 
page 41). 
Clearly, the de facto elimination of the alibi defense in every Idaho 
case by and through the logic that all crimes inherently contain aiding and 
abetting (accomplice) theory, whether such accomplice theory was charged in 
the Indictment or not (see JOHNSON, supra) could not have been the intent of 
the legislature, nor can such a conflict in (law) stand in light of due 
process rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. 
Df1spite the ruling in JOHNSON (145 Idaho 970) a jury instruction that 
constructively amends an Indictment implicates the defendant's right to have 
the grand jury's charges control the offense actually tried, (U.S. v. JONES, 
418 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2005)), and where a statute specifies certain things, 
the designation of such things excludes all others (Attorney General Opinion 
No. 94-3 citing PECK v. STATE, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820 (1942). 
In combination with the fact that Jury (charge) Instruction No. 42 allows 
the jury to disregard any (Jury) Instruction(s) where the jury finds that even 
relevant facts do not exist, the state's burden of proof was completely 
eliminated, and Shackelford is due relief sought herein. 
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(PREMEDITATED) MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (COUNTS I & II). 
Counts I and II of the Indictment charging Shackelford as a principal 
with MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE (Instructions No. 6 & 7 respectively) 
precluded the use of the (accomplice) instruction (No. 33) by specifically 
charging Shackelford with the actus reus of shooting and killing the victims. 
Because the jury was not instructed as to the limitations on attributing this 
element to the principal and not an accomplice based on the Indictment, 
(variance), the jury was allowed to conclude that some theoretical accomplice 
pulled the trigger, despite the explicit charge that Shackelford himself 
committed the homicide (actus reus). The jury was further free to conclude 
(impermissibly) that each of the mens rea elements (i.e., willfulness, 
deliberation, premeditation and malice) could be assigned or imputed to any 
number of theoretical accessories, or to Shackelford himself, and not limit 
all the elements required to convict to a single individual. Indeed, the trial 
court, post-conviction, correctly realized that the jury instructions, as 
given, did not indicate that the jury had found Shackelford guilty of being 
the principal in the murders: 
COURT: Well, do I have to find that he actually committed the 
offenses or that he was responsible for the commission of the 
offenses? 
PROSECUTOR: That he's responsible for the commission of those 
offense [sic]. 
COURT: Why doesn't the legislature --
PROSECUTOR: I cannot cite you right now off the top of my 
head what there is, but the finding that the death penalty 
can be imposed, I believe, is-- it's my belief looking at 
cases before that he is responsible for those deaths. 
COURT: Well, because I don't think the jury instructions that 
I gave necessarily found that he himself committed the 
offense, but was --
PROSECUTOR: I believe we argued that too, that the jury 
didn't have to find that. 
COURT: I think you did ••. 
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(Latah County Case No. CR00-00260, Tr.p. 5938, ln. 4-20). Even the state 
conceded that there is nothing in the record indicating that Shackelford 
was convicted by the jury as a principal in the crimes charged: 
PROSECUTOR: I do not believe that there is adequate - that 
there would be an adequate record to show that the jury found 
Mr. Shackelford directly committed the offense. 
(Latah County Case No. CVOl-004272 [PCR] Hearing 11/16/04; Tr.p. 146, ln. 
24 - p. 147, ln. 2). Because the actus ~of committing the crime charged 
- as required in the Indictments - were not found, nor even listed as an 
element which the jury must find before returning a verdict of guilty, the 
convictions can not stand (variance). 
In Idaho, all acts constituting FIRST DEGREE MURDER are contained 
within I.C. §18-4003 (et seq.), with Murder itself being defined in I.C. 
§18-4001. In both First and Second Degree Murder, the mens rea of Malice 
----
must be found by the jury, and necessarily attributed to the same person to 
whom the actus reus is assigned. Unlike Second Degree Murder however, First 
Degree Murder requires the jury to find the additional (mens rea) elements 
of premeditation, willfulness and deliberation (Instruction No. 13). These 
"states of mind" too are all, individually and collectively, necessarily 
attributable to the actus reus/actor (not to be confused with homicide 
committed during the commission of an underlying felony or FELONY MURDER). 
Because Instruction 33 allowed the jury to attribute any, some or none of 
the mens rea elements to the individual to whom the jury attributed the 
(actus reus) element (actually killing the victims) the conviction can not 
stand. Where Malice was not imputed to the (actus ~), neither first nor 
second degree murder convictions could stand. 
In every crime, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and 
intent (or criminal negligence), I.e. §18-114. Because ALL the elements of 
First Degree Murder could not have been found/assigned to Shackelford as a 
matter of fact or law, either as a principal or as one among the 
theoretical accomplices (aider & abetter) the convictions must be vacated. 
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ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE (COUNT III). 
As with Counts I & II, inclusion of Instruction No. 33 and the language 
therein eliminated the burden of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
essential elements of the crime charged in the Indictment, and constituted a 
variance between the Indictment and the verdict. 
Both Instructions No. 18 (Arson Indictment) and No. 19 ( jury· charge) 
specifically require the jury to attribute the actus reus of setting the fire 
in the garage to Shackelford. T "lr • .ul.n.ewise' the mens rea of "wilfully" setting the 
fire must be specifically attributed to Shackelford ( "the defendant, Dale 
Carter Shackelford, wilfully" [Instruction 19, ,r4]), thus, the accessory 
theory allowed by Instruction No. 33 could not be applied at all to 
Instruction No. 19, nor to the charge of Arson as presented in Count III of 
the Indictment. Failure to exclude Count III from the allowances made by 
Instruction No. 33 prejudiced the defendant, constituted fundamental error and 
the conviction must be vacated. 
PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE (COUNT VI). 
In Count VI of the Indictment (Instruction No. 29) and Instruction No. 30 
(jury charge) the requisite element that "the defendant, Dale Carter 
Shackelford, willfully [sic] prepared false evidence" (Instruction No. 30, ,r3) 
specifically assigned the actus reus of preparing the false evidence, and the 
mens rea of wilfully doing so to Shackelford. 
----
In addition to the above, the assignment/allowance of accomplice theory 
to ,r4 of Instruction No. 30 (i.e. , "with the intent to produce it of allow it 
to be produced, for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true") 
and ,r5 ( "at a grand jury proceeding in Latah County which was authorized by 
law.") allowed the jury to again assign accomplice theory to the mens rea 
(intent) to a theoretical person, despite it being unclear to whom the actus 
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reus was assigned. This variance is particularly prejudicial in that the 
undisputed evidence submitted to the jury was that the [audio tape] 
constituting the false evidence as charged was made (recorded) in the state of 
Missouri (thus, element/paragraph 2, Instruction No. 30 could not have been 
found as a matter of fact or law), and that the tape was turned over to Latah 
County (Idaho) sheriff's deputies at the request/instruction of Latah County 
deputy prosecutor Robin Eckmann by (co-defendant) Mary Abitz many months prior 
to the formation of the grand jury noticed in the Indictment or jury charge 
instruction. This precludes Shackelford from the role of actus reus or mens 
rea on elements to the crime of arson as either an accomplice or a principal. 
For the reasons set forth above, the language and application of 
Instruction No. 33, and the submission thereof without sufficient evidence to 
justify its submission to the jury, prejudiced the defendant, eliminated the 
burden of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt essential elements of 
the crime charged, constituted a variance between the Indictment and the 
verdict returned, and the conviction must be vacated. 
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CONSPIRACY (COUNTS IV & V) 
In Counts IV and V, Shackelford was charged with conspiracy to commit 
(underlying) crimes. In each of these counts of conspiracy, the jury was 
required to find that in furtherance of the conspiracy, Shackelford committed 
specific overt acts as listed in the Indictment (Instructions Nos. 22 & 25) 2• 
Instruction No. 24 defines Conspiracy as involving an agreement by two or 
more persons to commit a crime. In combination with Instruction No. 33, the 
jury was allowed to find that if one of the other listed co-conspirators (or 
an unnamed, unindicted co-conspirator) indeed conspired with another - even 
where Shackelford was not directly or factually involved - that Shackelford 
could be convicted on the Conspiracy counts based on the (accomplice) theory. 
Indeed, Instruction No. 33 in combination with the Conspiracy 
instructions/elements, precluded the need for the jury to find that 
Shackelford himself committed any of the overt acts required to have been 
committed by Shackelford. 
The failure to preclude the jury from applying Instruction No. 33 to the 
facts/elements contained within the Conspiracy Instructions/elements included 
in Instructions 22 & 25 eliminated the need of the jury to find, or the state 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that Shackelford as either a principal or 
an accomplice, committed any of the overt acts, or was guilty of the 
conspiracies as charged in the Indictments. The convictions on Conspiracy to 
Commit First Degree Murder and Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Arson 
therefore must be vacated. 
2 
The Indictments required a finding that Shackelford performed !each] of the overt acts 
listed, yet in the jury charge instructions, (Nos. 23 & 26) the jury was allowed to return a 
verdict of guilty having found "one of the parties to the agreement performed at least one 
of the !overt] acts" listed in the Indictments. This variance is prejudicial, reduced the burden 
of the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts charged by the Grand Jury In the 
Indictment, and alone constitutes cause to vacate the convictions on Conspiracy. 
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The prejudice resulting from the application of Instruction No. 33, is 
compounded as it relates to the two conspiracy counts against Shackelford in 
that the conspiracy allegations against the named co-conspirators were 
dismissed by the state immediately after Shackelford was convicted, giving 
credence to the allegations that the state used the conspiracy counts as a 
pretext to submit hearsay under the co-conspirator exception to hearsay rules. 
The prejudice to Shackelford is further illustrated by the court's 
colloquy at the sentencing hearing of (named/charged co-conspirator) Mary 
Abitz on November 1, 2001 - just one (1) week after Shackelford was sentenced 
to a (fixed) life term of imprisonment on the Conspiracy to Commit First 
Degree Murder by the same judge: 
[COURT]: With respect to the accessory to a felony 
charge, I'm having a difficult time differentiating between 
Sonja Abitz and Mary Abitz through I think vigorous 
representation was able to avoid having to plead to that 
offense. Mary Abitz while reluctant to plead to that charge, 
pled guilty pursuant to ALFORD v. NORTH CAROLINA. Were it not 
for Marty Millar recanting her testimony earlier on, I would 
have no difficulty imposing a conviction on that charge. Given 
Marty Millar's recent change in her testimony, I think an 
appropriate sentence is a withheld judgment on that charge. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, which testimony are you 
referring to, if I may ask? 
[COURT]: Specifically with regard to the testimony at 
which there was involvement by Mary Abitz in a conspiratorial 
fashion. So, I am placing Mary Abitz on 10 years probation on 
the accessory to murder charge. 
(Tr.p. 138, ln. 24 - p. 139, ln. 18. STATE v. MARY ABITZ, Latah County Case 
No. CR00-00262) 3 
3 
I ,C,§18-206 provides a statutory maximum sentence of five (5) years for the crime of 
accessory £to a felony) despite the imposition of a ten (10) year period of probation. The issue 
was ultimately rectified and the sentence satisfied. 
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Based on the facts of this case, were Mary (or Sonja) Abitz, both integral 
participants in the alleged conspiracy, found to have been either PRINCIPALS 
or ACCESSORIES to the conspiracy ( as allowed by Instruction No. 33) , the 
dismissal of the [arson and murder] conspiracy charges against both women left 
no person with whom Shackelford is alleged to have conspired, or could have 
committed the overt acts that Shackelford, as reflected in the record, clearly 
did not, or in some instances, could not have committed. 
Because the court allowed hearsay testimony during trial pursuant to the 
co-conspirator exceptions regarding matters said to have occurred prior to and 
after the dates the state alleged the conspiracy was in effect, the state's 
burden of proof, based on the application of Instruction No. 33, and supported 
by Instruction 42 in combination with the variance between the Indictment and 
jury (charge) instructions, was eliminated, depriving Shackelford of a fair 
trial. 
* * * 
[NOTE]: It is clear that the variance between the Conspiracy Indictments and 
jury (charge) Instructions 23 & 26 was accidental, and was a result of the 
bracketed [] section of ICJI 1101 pattern/model instruction [at least one of] 
being included within the text of the instructions submitted to the jury as 
elements where such was not included within the Indictment. Intentional or 
not, the inclusion of this phrase constituted a variance which was prejudicial 
and reduced the state's burden of proof. 
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II. STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TO DEFENSE DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING REPORT AND 
X-RAYS OF VICTIMS CONSTITUTES PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, RESULTED IN DUE 
PROCESS VIOLATION, AND RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
On June 1, 1999, Radiologist(s) at the St. Joseph Regional Medical Center 
in Lewiston, ID, pursuant to orders of Pathologist (and state trial witness) 
Dr. Robert Cihak, x-rayed the corpse of Victim A, subsequently identified as 
Donna Fontaine and wrote a report as to the findings made 4• 
The radiologist's report, along with attendant x-rays were not disclosed 
to the defense before or during trial despite Dr. Cihak having testified at 
trial to facts observed within the x-rays (Tr.p. 2181, ln. 9 - p. 2182, ln. 
17). The report and x-rays were not discovered by/to the defendant until late 
in 2004, well after the time the district court precluded Shackelford from 
raising pro se claims within the (original) application for post-conviction 
relief 5. 
Based on standard autopsy reports disclosed to the defense by the state 
prior to trial, it was known to the defense that the weight (mass) of the FULL 
METAL JACKET(ED) bullet identified by Dr. Cihak as having caused the death of 
Victim A (Tr.p. 2192, ln. 11-12) was approximately thirty five percent (35%) 
4 All arguments and documentation related to the Petitioner's SECOND ADDENDUM TO THIRD AMENDED 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF filed in this action but not ruled upon are incorporated 
herein by reference in their entirety, including exhibits/attachments thereto. Petitioner also 
incorporates the Compact Disk (CD) of the x-rays (R. 1857), Diagnostic Imaging Report and the 
AFFIDAVIT of Dr. Roderick Saxey dated 05 May 2005 as contained within this record herein by 
reference. 
5 
In its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS entered on 
April 8, 2005 in the above-styled case, the court held that given the limited relevance to the 
Petitioner's claim that Victim A was not Donna Fontaine, that the failure to disclose the 
Diagnostic Imaging report (and x-rays) would be dismissed per the State's request (id at pages 
5 - 7). The claim herein however reasserts the (BRADY, et al.) violations, and asserts prejudice 
related to the failure to disclose the report/x-rays, and the bearing such failure to disclose 
had on the defendant's ability to contradict the state's theory of the case, the ability to 
mount a justification or self-defense argument and other such collateral matters. 
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1 1 
lE:,ss weight(ed) as the bullet identified as having killed Victim B - and had 
lost twenty-five (25) grains (weight) of it's original seventy-one (71) grains 
(Tr p 2475, ln. 22 - p. 2476, ln 17), despite both bullets having been fired 
from the same gun (Tr.p. 2478, ln. 1-5). All attempts by the defense team to 
reconcile the discrepancy between the weight of the (originally identical) 
bullets went unresolved, utilized significant defense resources, and 
restricted the options relating to available defenses. 
Based on the radiological report and attendant x-rays, it became clear 
that the bullet with more than a third of its mass having been "sheared" away 
(Tr.p. 2474, ln. 15-18) had struck a very hard object before entering the body 
of Victim A, and had lost a considerable amount of velocity prior to 
penetration of the (neck), consistent with a ricochet, a means (of death) in 
direct contradiction to the manner of death espoused by the state to the jury 
of an execution-style slaying: 
PROSECUTOR [Christensen]: I can also tell you that at 
some point nearby [sic] the time the defendant takes aim with 
Donna's .32 calibre pistol and essentially executes her with a 
shot to the back of the neck in C4, which Dr. Cihak tells you 
causes almost instantaneous death. (Tr. p. 5277, ln. 1-5). 
The facts revealed in the x-rays dramatically illustrate that the bullet 
had not been sheared or fragmented inside the body of Victim A, nor does the 
missing (mass) appear inside the body ( AFFIDAVIT of Dr. Roderick Saxey) . 
Because a ( full metal jacketed) bullet is considerably harder than human 
cervical (neck) bones, a direct strike by such a projectile would have clearly 
shattered neck vertebra, and or passed through the tissue were no bone 
structures were impacted. Further, it is clear even to a layman that a human 
neck bone is incapable of shearing/tearing away thirty-five percent (35%) of a 
jacketed round with little more than a stress fracture, and the bullet simply 
"sticking" to the bone (Tr.p. 2189, ln. 2 - 13). 
Due to the clear and convincing nature of the report and x-rays 
indicating a ricochet of the bullet prior to entering the body of Donna 
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Fontaine which contradicts the state's allegations that Shackelford killed 
Donna Fontaine with an execution-style shot to the back of the neck, there is 
a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a verdict other 
than First Degree Murder. 
The State has a duty to disclose evidence that is both favorable and 
material either to guilt or punishment of the defendant BRADY v. MARYLAND, 373 
U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). Whether suppression is willful or inadvertent 
is of no consequence. Further, the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence 
favorable to the accused extends to information known only to police STATE v. 
GARDNER, 126 Idaho 428, 433, 885 P.2d 1144 (Ct.App. 1994); JACKSON v. BROWN, 
513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). Where a reviewing court finds a material 
BRADY/GIGLIO violation, and the suppressed evidence is not merely cumulative, 
there is no need for a harmless error review, KYLES v. WHITLEY, 514 U.S. 419, 
434 (1995). 
In post-conviction proceedings, the state conceded the [Diagnostic 
Imaging] report and x-rays were booked into evidence at the Latah County 
Sheriff's Office, but were never added to the prosecutor's file and as a 
result, [petitioner's] trial counsel never saw it (MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER REGARDING THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS, page 5). The state argues that 
the evidence was placed on a list of all other evidence collected by the Latah 
County Sheriff's Department, and that that list was disclosed to the defense 
team, however, Chief Deputy Prosecutor Robin Eckmann represented to the 
district court on November 15, 2004 that neither she, nor the prosecution had 
a copy of the evidence, but had "first read it" as an attachment to 
Petitioner's Response to State's Motion to Dismiss (R. 1857), (Tr.p. 458, ln. 
23 - p. 459, In. 7 : CVOl-004272). Petitioner leaves it to the Court to 
determine the credibility of Chief Deputy Prosecutor Eckmann's statement, but 
would point out that if the lead prosecutor in the case was unaware of the 
existence of the diagnostic imaging report and x-rays prior to or during 
trial, there is no possibility that defense counsel knew of it either. 
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1 
III. UNCURED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN VOUCHING FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF STATE 
WITNESSES IN COMBINATION WITH INAPPROPRIATELY EMPHASIZING ISSUES RELATED TO 
DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER NOT RELATED TO THE CRIMES CHARGED OR EVIDENCE PRODUCED 
AT TRIAL IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL CASE DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL AS 
GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
During closing arguments at trial, Deputy Prosecutor Robin Eckmann 
engaged in several instances of "vouching" for the credibility of state's 
witnesses who had testified at trial, thereby providing personal assurances 
and governmental backing of the veracity and credibility of those individuals. 
Eckmann' s comments further tended to convey the impression to jurors that 
evidence not produced at trial, but known to the state, supported the charges 
against the defendant. These statements were not cured, mitigated or minimized 
by any contemporaneous curative instruction to the jury. Further, Eckmann 
repeatedly and impermissibly demeaned the credibility and character of the 
defendant before the jury. 
Eckmann' s conduct during closing arguments at trial clearly constitute 
misconduct at such a level that (her) actions so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process of law 
(DARDEN v. WAINWRIGHT, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); U.S. v. YOUNG, 470 U.S. l, 
11-12 (1985)). Because the judge did not give a contemporaneous curative 
instruction regarding the improper statements and characterizations by the 
prosecutor, the convictions must be vacated. U.S. v. BERMUDEZ, 529 F. 3d 158 
(2d Cir. 2008). ([P]rosecutor's statement that defendant was lying, especially 
when contrasted with comment that government witness was "absolutely 
believable" was improper. HODGE v. HURLEY, 426 F.3d 368, 377 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
Further, Eckmann' s statements which inappropriately emphasized Shackelford' s 
character were improper because such comments were not related to the crimes 
charged or evidence produced at trial in defense of the charges (HODGE at 
384). 
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By and through paragraph 7 of jury Instruction No. 2, the jury was 
advised by the court that "Statements, remarks and arguments of the attorneys 
are not evidence, but are for purposes only of assisting the court or jury in 
their respective duties. Any such statement, remark or argument which does not 
conform to the evidence or these instructions should be disregarded." These 
two sentences, buried in the seventh paragraph of a boilerplate instruction, 
(No. 2 of 43) in no way cured or mitigated the significance of the 
statements/comments made by Eckmann, and can not be considered at all curative 
in light of both the impact and frequency of the statements made during 
closing arguments at Shackelford's trial: 
> (ECKMANN): I also want to talk for a minute about why the testimony of 
Bernadette Lasater and Marty Millar I believe is credible and should be 
believed by you ••• 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 3-9) 
> (ECKMANN): Number one, their statements are corroborated. Corroborated 
is a term that just means they're backed up, there's other evidence that 
supports what they've said, other evidence exists. 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 16-19) 
> (ECKMANN): But I would suggest to you that their testimony is credible 
for several reasons. 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 13-15) 
> (ECKMANN): And Bobby Emily, no reason at all to make this up, comes in 
and testifies before you, under oath ... 
(Tr.p. 5320, ln. 22-24) 
> (ECKMANN): Larry Thompson is absolutely telling the truth. 
(Tr.p. 5422, ln. 18-19) 
> (ECKMANN): It's the defendant who's lying, not Larry Thompson. 
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 18-19) 
> (ECKMANN): She [Karen Abitz] is telling the truth, and if she is telling 
the truth, the defendant crafted and manufactured a complex and intricate 
lie to cover up for this crime, but he can't have it both ways. 
(Tr.p. 5423, ln. 12-15) 
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> (ECKMANN): He [defense counsel] could not bring himself to look at you 
and tell you that Karen Abitz was a liar. He could not bring himself to 
do it because she's not . 
• p. 5423, ln. 8-11) 
> (ECKMANN): Well, it's entirely believable to me. 
(Tr.p. 5424, ln. 20) 
> (ECKMANN): But there are some very important other statements in this 
calendar that I think are worth noting, which I believe are credible. 
(Tr.p. 5426, ln. 3-5). 
In a long line of cases, Courts across the nation have maintained that a 
prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of witnesses in that such 
vouching carries with it the imprimatur of the government and may induce the 
jury to trust the government's judgment rather than its own view of the 
evidence (YOUNG, 470 U.S. at 18-19). The courts have also recognized that 
where a prosecutor states to the jury that a government witness had no reason 
to lie, that such a statement is improper (U.S. v. WEATHERSPOON, 410 F.3d 
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
Although each separate incident of Eckmann's vouching for the credibility 
of witness is in and of itself prejudicial, the cumulative effect of these 
comments is overwhelmingly prejudicial. Nowhere is such a single instance of 
vouching prejudicial however than in the vouching for the credibility of 
(state witness) Martha Millar. The following examples of just how prejudicial 
Eckmann's vouching for Millar was is reflected in the record of Latah County 
Case No. CR00-02022 at the sentencing hearing of Martha Millar on January 24, 
2001: 
(BY ECKMANN TO THE COURT): ••• and Ms. Millar exceeded our expectations in 
terms of the value of her cooperation and I think the value of her testimony 
to the prosecution of Dale Shackelford. 
(Tr.p. 36, ln. 1-4). 
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The Court made the prejudice even more clear in stating: 
(COURT): I also sat through the Dale Shackelford I and I have to say 
that your testimony was undoubtedly very beneficial to the State. Whether 
Dale Shackelford would have been convicted without that testimony is, as 
Ms. Eckmann points out, anyone's guess. But I think it will suffice to say 
that it was instrumental in Mr. Shackelford's conviction. 
(CR00-02022; STATE v. MILLAR, Tr.p. 39, ln. 13-19) 
Compounding the prejudice of Eckmann's statements, the Court, at 
Shackelford's trial, refused to allow defense counsel to present to the jury 
the extent of Martha Millar's deceit, subterfuge and lack of credibility, then 
allowed Eckmann to vouch for that credibility: 
(DEFENSE COUNSEL): Your Honor, it appears that the prosecutor is arguing 
that if the state puts on a witness and that witness is a liar the defense 
shouldn't be able to expose that person as being a liar. Well, that's what 
cross-examination and credibility is all about. 
(COURT): I don't think there's any doubt in this jury's mind that Ms. Millar's 
an admitted liar, an admitted liar under oath, under numerous instances. 
And the question I'm faced with is how many more of those do I allow, and 
I think it is collateral. So I'm sustaining the objection [of the prosecutor]. 
(Tr.p. 3171, ln. 22 - p. 3172, ln. 18) 
Where prosecutors make statements to the Jury which imply a personal 
belief, the Courts have taken a stand (prosecutor's statement that defendant 
was guilty was improper because [it] implied a personal belief rather than the 
government's position. U .s. v. SMITH, 982 F. 2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993)); 
(prosecutor's statements during closing argument regarding personal opinion of 
defendant's credibility improper. BOYD v. FRENCH, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th 
Cir. 1998) ) • Robin Eckmann' s persistent and straightforward personal 
accusations and opinions that Shackelford was a liar, and that Shackelford was 
not credible was incredibly improper and prejudicial (prosecutor's statement 
describing defendant as a "liar" improper because [statement was a] personal 
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opinion regarding defendant's credibility; U.S. v. GARCIA-GUIZAR, 160 F .3d 
511, 520, (9th Cir 1998) amended by 234 F.3d 483 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
As set forth above, Eckmann' s (general, negative) characterizations of 
the defendant were improper as well. In addition to HODGE, other Courts have 
addressed the prosecutorial use of improper characterizations of the defendant 
( see e.g.: MALICOAT v. MULLIN, 426 F. 3d 1241 ( 10th Cir. 2005). Because the 
opinions and statements made by Eckmann were not in response to [defense] 
counsel's statements, they can not be considered harmless. Additional examples 
of Eckmann's improper opinions, statements and speculations as to the 
character of the defendant during closing arguments are included below: 
> And he [defendant] could not control her with fear and intimidation, 
although, he tried. Despite his best efforts he could not control her with 
threats and with harassment and he couldn't stand it. So, ultimately he 
exercised the ultimate control on her. He killed her and he killed the man 
who was with her. 
(Tr.p. 5302, ln. 6-11) 
> And he [defendant] says that he does it to get her [victim] off his back, 
that's Shackelford truth, but that's not truth in the real world. That's 
not the truth in the real world. That was a twisted effort to torment her. 
(Tr.p. 5310, ln. 22-25) 
> [Defendant] Dale's persuasive, Dale is manipulative and on top of that 
Dale is very reassuring. Things will be fine, I will not get -- I will make 
sure you do not get in trouble. I will take care of you. When the truth, 
of course, is that Dale Shackelford no more cared for these women than he 
does for the butt of his cigarette that he tosses aside and steps on. Once 
its function is served, he's done with it. It can be discarded without further 
thought and moved on to the next useful item. Yet these women continued 
to do what the defendant asked them to do and no one benefited from this 
except the defendant. 
(Tr.p. 5313, ln. 4-15) 
> Why did they do did [sic]? It obviously wasn't the money he was 
them, that wasn't a big factor. Sex obviously had something to do 
But I submit in the end it was primarily two factors. Number one, 
the defendant's literally astonishing ability to manipulate them 
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paying 
with it. 
it was 
To call 
out of them what he wanted to accomplish in his end. And the second thing 
is his apparent gift for identifying and targeting woman [sic] who are likely 
to go along with that type of manipulation • 
• p. 5322, ln. 16-25) 
> In fact, this defendant uses people like they were paper towels. They're 
just things he uses, takes -- wipes up his mess, throws them away. And not 
only that, I think you'll all probably agree just based on common experience 
that it's probably common for people who are accused of a crime to lie. 
It's a human reaction that if you're accused of something and you want to 
protect yourself you lie. 
But this defendant does not just lie, he accuses. His lies are not 
just, I didn't do it, but look who else did. He doesn't care who might get 
convicted or charged as a result of his false statements. He does not just 
lie, he accuses. 
(Tr.p. 5350, ln. 9-21) 
> Mary Abitz made the very same statements that Brian Abitz made to the 
Suttons. She said the very same things. The Brian Abitz story, ladies and 
gentlemen, is a move to -- is a twisted, incredible and cowardly effort 
by the defendant to cast blame for his own criminal acts on a juvenile. 
He has every reason to lie about it. The bottom line of the defendant's 
statements is that they're hollow, they're self-serving, they're inconsistent, 
and they are simply untrue. 
(Tr.p. 5356, ln. 20 - p. 5357, ln. 4) 
> And the truth in this case is that Dale Shackelford killed Donna Fontaine 
and Fred Palahniuk and he did so with premeditation, with malice and with 
deliberation. He conspired to do so with Mary Abitz and Sonja Abitz. He 
burned their bodies to cover it up and he created false evidence. 
(Tr.p. 5357, ln. 18 - 23) 
> The person who is lying about what happened at that time and that location 
is the defendant. 
(Tr.p. 5422, ln. 23 - 25) 
> Basically the defendant's defense in this case is anything he can possibly 
hope to get just one of you to believe. Just one of you is all it takes. 
And so then he can just throw up all kinds of things that aren't consistent 
with each in the hopes that just one of you will buy one of his inconsistent 
arguments. 
(Tr.p. 5432, ln. 21 - p. 5433, ln. 2) 
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> Donna and Fred did not get to die with their loved ones gathered around 
them. They died in the presence of the cold hatred of Dale Shackelford. 
He took matters into his own hands on May 29th. He became a jury, prosecutor 
and then decided the case in his favor and became the sentencing judge and 
rendered his verdict and his sentence. 
(Tr.p. 5437, ln. 7 - 14) 
Based on the cumulative effect of the above, the misconduct of the 
prosecutor and the prejudice arising therefrom, the defendant was denied his 
right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, and 
all convictions in Latah County Case No. CR00-00260 must be vacated. 
Coupled with the allowance of impermissible hearsay by several witnesses 
at trial (declared "error" by the Idaho Supreme Court in STATE V. SHACKELFORD, 
150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582 (2010)) and the entirely circumstantial nature of 
the case against Shackelford, the improper vouching and statements/personal 
opinions espoused by prosecutor Eckmann were clearly prejudicial. Eckmann' s 
improper orations during trial also had a cumulative effect that substantially 
impaired Shackelford' s right to a fair trial, especially where the evidence 
against Shackelford was not overwhelming, and curative instructions were 
insufficient to protect Shackelford from the prejudicial statements made by 
the prosecutor U.S. v. CONRAD, 320 F.3d 851, 856 (8th Cir. 2003). 
Because Eckmann was not responding to any arguments made by defense 
counsel [invited response doctrine], such argument presented by Eckmann 
warrants the reversal of all convictions in this case (YOUNG, 470 U.S. at 13). 
(See also U.S. v. HERJV!..ANEK, 289 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
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N. SENTENCING BY THE COURT OF THE DEFENDANT TO A TERM OF 
(FIXED) LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER WITHOUT A JURY DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS WHICH WOULD 
ALLOW AN INCREASE IN THE MAXIMUM TERM OF IMPRISONMENT VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION. 
Idaho Code provides that a defendant convicted of conspiracy " shall 
be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is 
provided under the laws of the State of Idaho for the punishment of the crime 
or offense that each combined to commit." (I.C.§18-1701) (emphasis added.) It 
is clear then that having been convicted of Conspiracy to Commit First Degree 
Murder, where a sentence of death was available, and there [was] a requirement 
that the fact(tor)s upon which the determination of punishment were to be made 
were required to have been made by a jury, that Shackelford had the right to a 
jury determination of facts which increased his exposure to a sentence greater 
than ten ( 10) years to Life on the Conspiracy conviction as well. RING v. 
ARIZONA, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2848 (2002), A~~RENDI v. tiJEW_J:ERSEY; 530 U.S. 
466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). 
Idaho Code §19-2515 ( 5) provides that a defendant convicted of first 
degree murder (where a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty was properly/timely 
filed) is entitled to a special sentencing proceeding. If, at that special 
sentencing proceeding the existence of a statutory aggravating factor can not 
be unanimously established by the jury, the maximum term of imprisonment which 
may be imposed is ten (10) years to life (I.C.§19-2515(7)(c)). Because 
Shackelford was required to be sentenced "in the same manner" and to the "same 
extent" as with the [underlying] First Degree Murder convictions, such a 
special sentencing proceeding was required to have been held, and any facts 
used to increase the sentence from 10 to life ( to "fixed" life as imposed by 
the court) was required. STATE v. SHACKELFORD, 150 Idaho 355, 24 7 p. 3d 582 
(2010). 
AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 28 
The State filed a Notice to Seek the Death Penalty in Shackelford s case 
on each of the First Degree Murder counts, as well as the Conspiracy to Commit 
First Degree Murder. In dicta, the court, during the sentencing of 
Shackelford, stated the following: 
11 
••• On the conspiracy to commit murder, I construe the 
argument made by the State at the time of the sentencing 
recommendations to withdraw the request for the penalty of death 
for that charge and I impose a fixed life imprisonment for that." 
(Tr.p. 5999, ln. 22 - p. 6000, ln. 2)~ Despite the Court's "interpretation" 
that the state had in fact withdrawn the Notice to Seek the Death Penalty on 
the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder count, there is no motion, 
notice, document or other indicia or data in the record wherein the state 
expressed a desire to withdraw the Notice, thus, the Notice had not been 
factually, properly or procedurally withdrawn, and was still in effect at the 
time of sentencing. Shackelford therefore maintained the right of the jury 
determination of the existence of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors 
which would allow a sentence greater than 10 to life being imposed. The 
considerably increased sentence of (fixed) life imprisonment as pronounced by 
the court without jury findings was, and continues to be, in violation of 
Shackelford's Sixth amendment rights in that the judge alone found the 
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense which allowed the 
increase in sentence. BLAKELY v. WASHINGTON, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531 
(2004)). 
Based on the above, the Court must vacate the sentence of (fixed) life, 
and resentence Shackelford to a term not less than 10 years, not to exceed 
life, or initiate a special sentencing proceeding. 
6 Petitioner theorizes that the Court was referring to a statement made by the state that 
requested the "maximum [sentence] that's authorized by law" on each conviction. Prosecutor Eckmann 
obviously misspoke, asking only for a life sentence on this "non-capital" crime, when the possible 
maximum sentence on the Conspiracy to Commit Murder was death (Tr,p.5994. In. 21 - p.5995, In. 2). 
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V. LACK OF IMPARTIALITY ON THE PART OF TRIAL COURT JUDGE JOHN STEGNt;R 
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL, THEREBY DENYING DEFENDANT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Judge John Stegner's exposure to inadmissible, unreliable and prejudicial 
information regarding Shackelford, as well as to disputed evidentiary facts 
from sources outside the record of ANY case, biased Judge Stegner to the 
extent he could not fairly and impartially preside over the trial of Dale 
Shackelford. 
As a result of having been exposed to data regarding Shackelford, Judge 
Stegner has, and continues to form and express his personal opinions regarding 
Shackelford - opinions not supported by evidence in the record, and which 
Shackelford has and continues to dispute. One such opinion formed and 
expressed by the judge is that Shackelford had "manipulated, deceived, and 
coerced others to commit acts they would not otherwise do." (R. 39398, pp. 
64-66; 27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol. III, pp. 500, 502, STATE v. LASATER, 
Latah County Case No. CR00-00264). 
In refusing to set bail for Shackelford, Judge Stegner had formed an 
opinion that proof (of Shackelford's guilt) was evident, or that there was a 
great presumption that Shackelford was guilty of the crimes charged - even 
before Shackelford' s entering of a plea ( Idaho Constitution Article I, §6 
requires bail to be set in capital cases except where proof is evident or 
presumption is great). 
Judge Stegner' s propensity for making use of information outside the 
record in forming opinions are reflected in his own words from the bench where 
he recited data available exclusively from a Latah County Sheriff's Department 
report: 
[COURT]: Well, let's get to the point. This statement, 
which I saw during the trial or shortly before the trial, is 
some of the most incriminating testimony against Dale 
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Shackelford. As I was saying, this statement is some of the most 
incriminating testimony I saw at the time of trial or prior to 
trial. I still think it's some of the most incriminating 
testimony against Dale Shackelford. It didn't come out at trial. 
And now I think the effort is to try to distance Ms. Abitz from 
this statement. 
(R.39398, p.67; 27966/31928 Supplemental R. Vol. III, pp. 500, 502 (STATE v. 
SONJA ABITZ, Latah County Case No. CR00-00263, Sentencing Tr.p. 42, ln. 
3-11)). The statement to which the judge referred was made by Sonja Abitz on 
February 12, 2000 immediately after her ( and Shackelford' s) arrest without 
benefit of counsel, while in custody, during an interrogation by a law 
enforcement officer. Again, despite Judge Stegner's mischaracterization of the 
statement as "testimony", the statement was never even offered as evidence in 
any case associated with Shackelford or any of his co-defendants. This 
(uncounseled) statement, available only as a police narrative, was never made 
part of any record until Judge Stegner uttered these words in open Court. How 
Judge Stegner came about this statement is still unclear, and subject to 
discovery through an evidentiary hearing. 
Judge Stegner' s opinion regarding Shackelford has also been made clear 
post-trial. At sentencing (2001), Judge Stegner imposed the maximum sentences 
allowed by law on all counts except Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder 
( to which Shackelford was sentenced to FIXED life rather than Death as was 
available), despite knowing that the recantation of (co-defendant) Martha 
Millar was such that the conviction on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree 
Murder was questionable (see Claim I, page 16 herein). 
In resentencing Shackelford in 2011, Judge Stegner stated on the record 
his personal hopes that Shackelford would never be released from prison (Tr.p. 
74, ln. 18). Despite his previous (2001) statement at sentencing that the 
sentences would be run concurrent because there was no reason to "pile on" 
(Tr.p. 6000, ln. 7-9), Judge Stegner, imposing the new sentences, ran each of 
the (fixed) life sentences· consecutively, and each consecutive to the (fixed) 
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life sentence imposed on the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder, indeed 
now "piling on" after more than 10 years of proceedings involving Shackelford. 
Judge Stegner has also denied every motion by Shackelford to recuse or 
disqualify himself from each proceeding. 
It has long been established that the right to due process of law 
requires an impartial judge (Idaho Constitution, Article I, §13; U.S.C. 
Amendments 6 & 14), STATE v. SANDOVAL-TENA, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 
(2003), TUMEY v. OHIO, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In federal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§455 ( 1) provides that a judge must recuse himself... where he has personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 
The rationale behind the federal recusal standards (statute) is concerned 
largely with insuring that the [federal] judiciary appears to be impartial, in 
addition to actually being impartial. U.S. v. SYPOLT, 346 F.3d 838, 840 (8th 
Cir. 2003) • The standard reaches farther than does the due process clause, 
which is concerned primarily with the individual rights of the parties. This 
is significant because if a claim cannot pass muster under the federal recusal 
statute, it cannot survive the more rigorous standards required of a claim 
under the due process clause, (SYPOLT). (See also JOHNSON v. CARROL, 369 F.3d 
253, 262 (3rd Cir. 2004).) 
Although petitioner acknowledges the differences in state and federal 
recusal standards, the premise that Idaho judges don't have to be as impartial 
as federal judges can not be sustained. Based on the lack of impartiality of 
Judge Stegner at and prior to trial, Judge Stegner' s personal knowledge of 
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding, and the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant thereby, the convictions in Case No. CR00-00260 must 
be vacated. 
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4 
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF POST-CONVICTION/UNIFIED APPELLATE COUNSEL 
DEPRIVED PETITIONER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
In Idaho, the right of appeal is statutory (Idaho Code §19-2801; STATE v. 
ANDERSON, 83 Idaho 263, 361 P.2d 787 (1961)). Further, judges are not required 
to second-guess reasonable, professional judgments of [appellate] counsel, nor 
to impose upon appointed counsel a duty to raise every colorable claim 
suggested by a client (JONES v. BARNES, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (1983)). 
In this case, Shackelford argues that [appellate] counsel's failures to 
investigate, research or consider valid, colorable claims upon which relief 
sought herein might have been granted did not comport with the minimum 
standards of professional judgment required of counsel, and was not within the 
range of competence demanded of attorneys by the courts (McMANN v. 
RICHARDSON, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970)~ This is especially egregious 
in Idaho where capital-case appeal and post conviction counsel are required to 
be specially trained, experienced and held to a much higher standard than 
non-capital qualified counsel (Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3). 
Coupled with the ambiguity of which claims could be raised in which 
proceeding (i.e., §19-2719, unified appeal, §19-4901, etc.) counsel had "put 
off" raising various claims with the understanding that the claim(s) would 
(only) be cognizable in the "next" phase of review. When Shackelford attempted 
to raise claims pro se because (post-conviction) counsel failed to raise 
[them], this court precluded Shackelford from filing pro se claims at all. 
Because of this, the claims set forth herein are not procedurally barred, and 
must be reviewed upon the merits. 
Petitioner hereby reserves the right to amend, supplement and augment 
this claim as necessary upon the appointment of counsel in this case. 
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correct, and are presented without intent of vexation or del{J. 
Shacke~ 
Petitioner, prose 
TH 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED BEFORE ME THIS !3 DAY OF 
~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My commission Expires: 
SEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify by my signature below that I have caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED [SUCCESSIVE] PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF, attachments and exhibits thereto, along with the attendant Motions 
for Appointment of Counsel & Evidentiary Hearing and Motion to Take Judicial 
Notice to be mailed (served) upon the State by placing same in the hands 
of the prison paralegal for mailing, postage pre-paid to: 
Mr. William Thompson, Jr. 
Latah County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843-0568 
ON THIS DAY OF !-LY 
. ) 
Shackelford, PETITIONER. 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
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Affidavit 
J, Roderick Saxey, MD, based on radiograpbs submitted to me for review~ do solenmly 
affirm the following: 
i. The bullet seen as a metallic foreign body on radiographs of Victim A, in the r.egio.n of 
the neck, is deformed and appears to have been sheared off. No smaller bullet fragments 
are in this region. 
2. It is unlikely that this deformity could have occurr.ed in the cervical spine without 
substantial damage to the vertebrae or fragmentation of the bullet. 
3. The cause of the deformity and shearing is not evident on the radiographs and may 
have been caused by ricochet off a hard object prior to entry into fue body. 
'~ 
Roderick Saxey, MD 
-q-
5:c.---day of_M~~~-~---' 2005. 
By: (Your name) l(fJY.2fi(Zfd{=5fn;;z M}) 
 ______ ~----
DATED this 
RIBED AND s;7 to before me this.;;;~day of )7'k1J=- , 2005. 
V ~ 
Notary PubUc for Washington 
My commission Expires: ,e;/--/4-:: of 
1 - )c -'; ;;.-
0001 49 
Dale C. Shackelford 
#64613 / ICC 
P.O. Box 70010 
ID 83707 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
DALE C. SHACKELFORD, ) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV-2001-4272 ) 
) MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS v. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) 
Respondent. ) 
": 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, prose, and moves this Court to resume the 
proceedings in the above-styled case. Petitioner states that the reasons/ 
purpose of suspending the action have been resolved (resentencing), and that 
the claims presented within the post-conviction application are distinctly 
different from those raised on appeal from the resentencing now pending as 
stated within the application (pg. 2 - 3). 
DATED THIS~ DAY OF ::S-~L;) 2012. 
/JJd!J). /I~ 
~f!'~. Shackel~ 
Prose PETITIONER. 
MOTION TO RESUME PROCEEDINGS l 
